I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Although job-to-job mobility may facilitate employment adjustment, the impact of job-to-job movement has never been fully implemented into labour-demand models. In this paper, job-to-job mobility is a worker's change of jobs between di erent ® rms. In labour-demand literature the out¯ow part of job-to-job movement, voluntary quits, is captured, mainly in theoretical studies (Nickell, 1986 and Bertola, 1992) , but recently also in some empirical studies (Burgess, 1993 , Hamermesh, 1995 , and Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996 . For the in¯ow part of job-to-job movement a distinction between di erent sources of applicants is necessary, but so far this topic has not been discussed in labour-demand studies.
The purpose of this paper is to derive the conditions under which job-to-job movement has a positive impact on the level of employment, and to estimate the relationship. Job-to-job mobility is a very complex phenomenon because it involves matches of heterogeneous workers with heterogeneous ® rms. Our paper concentrates on the role of the employment regime (hiring, do-nothing or ® ring) and the hiring and ® ring costs. Our model is very simpli® ed: ® rms have equal technologies, although they may be in di erent employment regimes (® ring, do-nothing or hiring) and they have di erent hiring costs. Quits of workers to other ® rms are considered as an exogenous process. We do not consider the impact of e cient wages (Stiglitz, 1986 ).
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the theoretical micro-model; Section III considers its macro-implications; Section IV discusses some tentative estimation results; Section V concludes.
I I . TH E O R Y
This section constructs a micro-framework describing the relationship between employment and job-to-job mobility. To determine the optimal employment path, ® rm i maximizes the expected discounted future pro® ts 
where E t is the expectations operator conditional on the information available at time t, / is discount factor, P is a concave production function, L is the level of employment, which is homogeneous inside a ® rm, Z are other production factors, w is the real wage, p r is the real price of the rth production factor, R + 1 is the number of production factors, N the number of ® rms, and C is an adjustment cost function.
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Following Hamermesh (1995) , our functional form of the production function is where j`, z and c are positive parameters of the production function; j is a serially uncorrelated error process, with zero mean and ® nite variance.
The adjustment costs C are split into net and gross adjustment costs, because Hamermesh (1995) demonstrates empirically that both sources of turnover costs are present. Net adjustment costs are the costs of a change of the long-run levels of employment. Gross adjustment costs are the costs of the total in¯ow of workers, which are, for instance, the costs of selection and training, or the costs of the total out¯ow of workers, which are the costs of ® ring. We distinguish between the hiring of previously unemployed and employed workers, having marginal gross adjustment costs 2n 1 , i F iu and 2n 2 F iq , respectively. The former are heterogeneous across ® rms. The di erence is caused by heterogeneous training costs, but we assume that after training the workers inside the ® rm are homogeneous.
The model is based on three additional simplifying assumptions. The ® rst simplifying assumption is that there are di erent employment regimes: a`hiring regime' in which the ® rm only hires; a`do-nothing regime', in which the ® rm neither hires nor ® res; and a`® ring regime', in which the ® rm only ® res. This framework implies that a ® rm does not hire and ® re simultaneously. Note that this framework is only suitable for labour that is homogeneous inside ® rms. Obviously, this is not very realistic. demonstrated that due to heterogeneous labour a lot of ® rms hire and ® re simultaneously. The second assumption is that both the type of applicants and the quit decision of the worker are exogenous for a ® rm. The third assumption is that we assume that a ® rm does not form a pool of applicants, but hires the ® rst suitable applicant, whether previously employed or unemployed. Hence, it is possible that a ® rm hires previously unemployed and employed workers within the same period.
The adjustment cost functions of ® rm i for the three regimes are, respectively,
F represents various workers¯ows; the superscripts iq and iu denote the in¯ow of employed and unemployed workers, respectively; the superscripts xq and xu denote the out¯ow of a worker to another job or into unemployment, respectively; n 0 , n 1 , i , n 2 and n 3 are positive parameters. The marginal gross ® ring costs are 2n 3 F xu . In a ® ring regime no gross adjustment costs are connected to a voluntary out¯ow F xq , since, with homogeneous labour, quits contribute to the reduction of employment, which a ® rm in a ® ring regime wants to attain. In a ® ring regime the number of quits may be larger than the planned decrease of the level of employment, which leads, consequently, to hiring of workers. We abstract from this case, because it does not provide additional knowledge about job mobility. Net adjustment costs are the same for all regimes. However, Equation 3 re¯ects an asymmetric relationship between quits and adjustment costs. In a hiring regime a voluntary out¯ow of workers may increase the adjustment costs. On the other hand, in a ® ring regime such an out¯ow of workers decreases the adjustment costs, as can readily be observed from Equation 3c.
Appendix A derives the labour demand equations for the three regimes. The labour demand equation for a ® rm in a hiring regime is
where a and g are parameters, and w º Z 0 . The parameter h i is equal to
where r iq is the AR-parameter of the AR (1) 
shows that if the hiring costs of a previous employed worker are lower (higher) than the hiring costs of a previously unemployed worker, the in¯ow of previously employed workers has a positive (negative) impact on employment.
In the same way, it is possible to derive the labour demand equations for a ® rm in a do-nothing regime and a ® ring regime. These are, respectively,
shows that in a ® ring regime, higher ® ring costs, n 3 , lead to a more negative impact of quits on employment. Thus, if ® ring costs are low, quits have less impact on employment than if ® ring costs are high. In the extreme case of absence of ® ring costs (n 3 = 0), a quit has no impact on employment, since the ® rm faces two options to reduce employment, voluntary quits or ® ring, which both have no gross adjustment costs.
This section considers the implications of the micro-equations for labour demand at the macro-level. To keep things simple, we ® rst discuss two cases in which one worker moves from one ® rm to another. In both cases, the worker moves to a ® rm in a hiring regime. The ® rm from which the worker quits is, in the ® rst case, also in a hiring regime, but in the second case it is in a ® ring regime. Next, we construct the aggregate equation for all ® rms. We do not explicitly discuss job-to-job movement from a ® rm in a donothing regime, since, if we take n 3 = 0, then a voluntary quit from a ® ring ® rm and a do-nothing ® rm have the same implications.
L abour mobility from a hiring Þ rm to another hiring Þ rm Suppose that both ® rm i and ® rm j want to hire one extra worker. We ® rst investigate for which values of n 1 , i , n 1 , j and n 2 , the marginal gross adjustment costs in the case of absence of a quit between ® rm i and j are larger than the marginal gross adjustment costs in the case of a quit between ® rm i and j. Only then, can job-tojob movement have a positive impact on the level of employment. Next, we compare this outcome with the coef-® cient of job-to-job movement in the aggregate employment equation.
If there is no movement of a worker between ® rm i and j, then both ® rms hire an unemployed worker. According to Equation 3a, the marginal gross adjustment costs without a quit are 2n 1 , i + 2n 1 , j . In the case of a job switch from ® rm j to ® rm i, ® rm i hires the employed worker from ® rm j, and ® rm j hires two unemployed workers, since both ® rms want to expand employment with one person each. The marginal gross adjustment costs become 2n 2 + 4n 1 , j . Job-to-job movement has a positive impact on employment only if the marginal gross adjustment costs, in the case of absence of job mobility between both ® rms, are larger than the marginal gross adjustment costs in the case of a worker moving between both ® rms. Hence,
Thus, job-to-job mobility will increase employment at the aggregate level if the marginal gross adjustment costs of hiring an unemployed worker are much lower (at least n 2 ) for ® rm j than for ® rm i. Note that if both ® rm i and ® rm j have the same marginal gross adjustment costs of hiring an unemployed, then the LHS of Equation 5 is zero. In that case both ® rms lose when a worker moves from one ® rm to the other, because in total it leads to higher marginal gross adjustment costs. This is the case, even if the marginal gross adjustment costs of a quit (2n 2 ) are relatively low.
We compare Equation 5 with the coe cient of job-to-job mobility in an aggregate labour-demand equation. Concentrating on the in¯ow and out¯ow of workers, the labourdemand equations of ® rm i and j are, essentially,
where the dots represent the other explanatory variables which have been omitted for convenience. Suppose there is one quit from ® rm j to ® rm i, hence 
where job-to-job movement JJ = F iq t = F xq t . Quits have a positive impact on the level of employment if the coecient of job-to-job mobility is positive, or
This is almost equal to Equation 5, except for a scaling factor h j /h i . According to Appendix A,
Recall that (1 -a i ) is the speed of adjustment of employment of ® rm i. From Equations A3 and A4 in Appendix A one can derive that n 1 , j < n 1 , i implies a j > a i . This is also intuitively clear, since larger gross adjustment costs of the in¯ow of unemployed workers leads to a slower speed of adjustment of employment. h i is determined by / , c 0 , n 0 and n 1 , i ; the exact relationship is very complex. We have simulated h j /h i for di erent values n 1 , i and n 1 , j , using several realistic values of / , c 0 and n 0 , based on estimates of Sargent (1978) and Meese (1980) . It appears that ratio h j /h i is slightly larger than one, and varies only moderately. Simulation results are available from the authors upon request.
Equations 6a, b also imply that if ® rm i and j hire one worker from each other, the coe cient of JJ becomes -(h i + h j )n 2 . Hence, job-to-job mobility has a negative impact on aggregate employment, if two ® rms exchange a worker.
L abour mobility from a Þ ring Þ rm to a hiring Þ rm
The second case concerns job-to-job mobility from a ® rm in a ® ring regime to a ® rm in a hiring regime. Again, we ® rst investigate the e ect of job-to-job mobility on the gross adjustment costs for both ® rms. Recall that a reduction of gross adjustment costs of employment has a negative impact on employment for the ® ring ® rm, but a positive impact on employment for the hiring ® rm. Therefore, in order to obtain a positive relationship between aggregate employment and aggregate quits, the ® rm in the hiring regime should have relatively low gross adjustment costs, whereas the ® rm in the ® ring regime should have high gross adjustment costs. Hence, in this case, we may not compare the situation without quits with the situation with quits, such as in Equation 5. Instead, we compare the reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the ® ring ® rm due to a quit instead of ® ring a worker, with the reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the hiring ® rm, due to hiring an employed worker instead of an unemployed. If the former is smaller than the latter, job-tojob mobility has a positive impact on the aggregate level of employment.
Suppose ® rm i hires an unemployed worker, with marginal gross adjustment costs 2n 1 , i , and ® rm j ® res an employed worker, with marginal gross adjustment costs 2n 3 . Quits have a positive impact on employment for both ® rms taken together, only if the decrease of the marginal gross adjustment costs of the hiring ® rm (2n 1 , i -2n 2 ) is larger than the decrease of the marginal gross adjustment costs, (2n 3 -0) (no costs are connected with a quit), of the ® ring ® rm:
Next, we compare this result with the coe cient of job-tojob mobility in the aggregate labour-demand equation of both ® rms. The labour-demand equation of ® rms i and j are
Job-to-job mobility has a positive impact on employment at the aggregate level, if
Simulations have shown that h j /h i is about equal to one.
T he aggregate equation
The two previous sub-sections have demonstrated under which restrictions a quit between two ® rms leads to a positive impact on the level of employment. Job-to-job movement can be considered as an allocation process, which changes the adjustment costs overall. It is possible that job-to-job mobility between two ® rms is not an optimal allocation process, for instance, if n 1 , i and n 1 , j do not di er su ciently for two ® rms in a hiring regime, and yet an employee changes jobs. The labour-demand equation at the macro level becomes
where the coe cients are weighted sums of the coe cients of the individual labour-demand equations. The sign of g R+ 1 is indeterminate.
I V . E MP I R I C A L R E S U L T S
This section presents the estimation and test results of Equation 13. Ideally, one should use a data set of ® rms containing information on the hiring costs from di erent sources of workers. Because we have no access to such a data set, we use quarterly manufacturing data for the Netherlands as a ® rst step. We take as explanatory variables in the vector Z: the real wage (w), the real capital stock (K), measures of competitiveness (COMP), world trade shocks (W T ) and adjusted ® scal stance (AD) and an index of technical progress ( T P). Appendix B provides a description of these variables.
Notice that the aggregate labour-demand Equation 13 is based on aggregation across ® rms with heterogeneous, ® rmspeci® c labour, with di erent responses. Therefore, we specify a functional form with additional lags on all variables in Equation 13 (cf. Nickell, 1986) . Application of the augmented DickeyÐ Fuller unit root test indicates that the presence of a unit root in all variables involved, with a possible exception of WT, cannot be denied. Hence, if the error process is stationary, we can rewrite Equation 13 in error-correction form
where m is the deterministic part of the equation, consisting of a constant and seasonal dummy variables, D is the di erence operator D k X º X t -X t ± k and e t is an uncorrelated white-noise error process. All explanatory variables in Equation 14 are lagged in order to evade simultaneity bias of the estimates of the parameters.
Our approach to model speci® cation is to move from general to speci® c. Also the standard battery of misspeci® cation tests will be applied in order to assess the statistical validity of the model involved. As tests on cointegration we apply the Wald test developed by Boswijk (1992) and the standard tests of Engle and Granger (1987) . Both indicate that cointegration, as assumed to be present in Equation 14, cannot be rejected. Results of unit root, simpli® cation and cointegration tests can be obtained from the authors on request. The simpli® ed model that is ® nally selected, is presented in Table 1 .
This model has the following implications. First, the short-run demand elasticity including scale e ects, based on Hamermesh (1993) , which can be obtained from the error-correction part of the model, is -0.32. This is very much in line with the survey of empirical studies from Hamermesh (1993) who argues that the elasticity should be about -0.30. The coe cients of D 1 COMP t ± 1 and D 1 W T t ± 1 have the expected sign. The negative sign of the capital stock variable implies substitution between labour and capital. The coe cient of the JJ t ± 1 is positive, implying that an increase in the job-to-job mobility rate contributes to expanding employment. The elasticity with respect to job-to-job movement is about 0.23.
In Equations 4a and 4c, we introduced the possibility of a di erent e ect of quits on employment, depending on the assumption of whether the ® rm is in a hiring regime or in a ® ring regime. However, the estimates of Table 1 imply a constant impact. We next try to relax this assumption by weighting the quits over the number of ® rms in a hiring and a ® ring regime. The weights applied are based on the¯ow of persons into and out of employment. Out¯ow F x equals the total number of persons moving from employment into unemployment and non-participatio n in the Netherlands. Then in¯ow F i is de® ned as
, where L tot is the total number of workers in the Netherlands. Total mobility from ® rms in a ® ring regime to ® rms in a hiring regime is approximated by
t ) then mobility from ® rms in a hiring regime to other ® rms in a hiring regime is
This approach yields the model presented in Table 2 . Like the model in Table 1 , none of the diagnostic tests seem to indicate that it is severely misspeci® ed.
The estimation results of this extended model show that the coe cients of the explanatory variables are of a similar magnitude as those of the model in the Table 1 . In this case, we ® nd a wage elasticity with scale e ect of -0.27. The distinction we make between quits in a hiring and in a ® ring regime, seems to suggest that only quits in a ® ring regime have a positive and signi® cant impact on employment, whereas the in¯uence of quits in a hiring regime appears to be negative and insigni® cantly di erent from zero. Hence, the e ect of job-to-job mobility on employment is larger in case a majority of ® rms is in a ® ring regime. The elasticity with respect to JJf equals 0.51. Turning back to the theory of Sections II and III, we can draw the following tentative conclusions from our empirical results. First, job-to-job mobility appears to have a signi® -cant positive impact on employment. Second, in distinguishing hiring and ® ring regimes, it appears that the impact of job-to-job mobility on employment is signi® cantly di erent between those regimes. This suggests that there is considerable heterogeneity between ® rms, which is also implied by our theory. Job mobility from a ® rm in a ® ring regime to a hiring ® rm appears to have a particularly strong, positive e ect on employment. According to Equation 12 the positive sign of JJf indicates that the bene® ts for the ® rm with increasing employment, i.e. hiring an employed worker instead of an unemployed, are larger than the bene® ts for the ® rm with decreasing employment, i.e. not having to ® re the worker. This might indicate that for a lot of ® rms the hiring costs of employed workers are smaller than the hiring costs of unemployed workers, which is in accordance with Blau and Robins (1990) and Lindeboom et al. (1993) . In the case of job mobility from a ® rm in a hiring regime to a hiring ® rm, JJh has a negative yet insigni® cant e ect on employment. Equation 7 shows that the non-positive sign of JJh implies a weak heterogeneity concerning in¯ow costs of unemployed workers across ® rms. In that case job mobility between two ® rms in a hiring regime is not bene® cial for both ® rms.
V . C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper we have demonstrated theoretically under which conditions labour mobility between two ® rms has a positive impact on the aggregate level of employment. We have derived the upper bound of the marginal hiring costs of an employed worker, for which job-to-job movement has a positive impact on aggregate employment. We have distinguished two cases. In the ® rst case, a worker moves from a ® rm in a hiring regime to another ® rm in a hiring regime. Job-to-job movement increases the gross adjustment costs of the ® rm from which the employee leaves, but may reduce the in¯ow costs for the ® rm to which the employee moves. We have demonstrated that for those pairs of ® rms, job-tojob mobility has a positive impact on aggregate employment if the di¤ erence in marginal adjustment costs of hiring an unemployed worker between both ® rms is larger than the marginal hiring costs of an employed worker. In the second case, a worker moves from a ® rm in a ® ring regime to a ® rm in a hiring regime. This movement leads to a reduction of gross adjustment costs for both ® rms. In this case, job-tojob movement has a positive impact on employment if the reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the ® rm in the hiring regime is larger than the reduction for the ® rm in the ® ring regime. We conclude that it is not possible to establish the sign of job-to-job movement in the aggregate employment equation a priori, unless the size of the in¯ow costs of employed and unemployed workers of both ® rms is known. This is in line with Caballero (1992) , who argues that aggregation may lead to indeterminate relationships.
The heterogeneity of the in¯ow costs of unemployed workers over ® rms is an important element of the theoretical framework. Therefore, the relationship between quits and employment should ideally be tested with micro-data, containing at least information on the source and the costs of the in¯ow of workers. We have estimated the relationship with macro-data for the Netherlands. It appears that job-to-job mobility has a substantial positive impact on employment, implying that job mobility is bene® cial for the demand for labour. From a policy point of view it indicates that to stimulate employment growth it is important to promote job mobility of workers. For instance the government should ensure that a job change does not reduce the pension claim of a worker (this still may happen in the Netherlands). Basically, this is in accordance with measures to stimulate a more¯exible labour market.
In our empirical model we have made an e ort to distinguish quits from ® rms in a ® ring regime to ® rms in a hiring regime, and quits from ® rms in a hiring regime to other ® rms in a hiring regime. The former variable has a positive coe cient, indicating that the reduction in training costs for the hiring ® rm is larger than the reduction in ® ring costs for the ® rm with decreasing employment. This estimate indicates that the hiring costs of an unemployed may be larger than the hiring costs of an employed worker. The latter variable has a insigni® cant, negative, coe cient, which leads to the conclusion that the heterogeneity in in¯ow costs of unemployed workers is not so large that job mobility between two hiring ® rms facilitates aggregate employment adjustment.
AP P EN D I X A . M I C R O L A B O U R -D E M A N D EQ U A T I O N S
For its employment decision, the maximization problem of ® rm i in a hiring regime is
Using the de® nition of P in Equation 2, this is equal to
where the transversality condition is
We follow Sargent (1978) and Hamermesh (1995) by modelling forward-looking expectations. The solutions of the Euler equation, after factorisation, is
where 0 Sargent, 1978 and Hamermesh, 1995) . The labourdemand equation becomes
We de® ne w º Z 0 , and suppose r iq » r xq . Equation A5 becomes in obvious notation
where
In the same way, the labour demand in the do-nothing regime and the ® ring regime can be derived. All variables are based on those used by Layard and Nickell (1986) and Burgess (1993) . Interpolation is done by means of a third order polynomial function, unless mentioned otherwise.
AP P EN D I X B . D A T A S O U R C ES , D E F I N I TI O N S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S
L : Paid employment in the manufacturing sector in thousand man years, interpolated. Burgess (1993) takes the actual number of employed as a measure of labour demand. Unfortunately, for the Netherlands this series is only available from 1978 on. Because we study data of the manufacturing sector, and part-time jobs are rare in manufacturing, our measure of employment in labour years seems to be a good proxy for the actual number of employed (CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek 1990). Source: L , CBS, NA 1969Ð 1984 and various issues, Table D12 .
K:
Real value of the capital stock of the manufacturing sector, interpolated. The nominal capital stock CS is calculated as
where D is the depreciation and I is the investment in manufacturing. To yield K, CS is de¯ated by the real price of capital, de® ned by de¯ating the price index of investment goods (P inv ) by the producers price index of ® nished products (P y 
(GOV DEB T /PO T GDP)],
where GOV DEF is government de® cit, (ICOS T ) GOV DB T is the (interest payment of ) government debts and PO T GDP is the potential GDP, which we de® ne as
where GDP is the actual GDP and CAPU T is the capacity utilization rate. Source: GOV DEF, CBS, NA, Table R5 ; GOV DEB T , CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues; (ICOS T ) GOV DEBT , CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues; GDP, CBS, NA 1969Ð 1984 and various issues, Table M3 ; CAPU T , OECD, MEI, various issues.
T P: measure of labour augmenting technical progress, interpolated. T P is computed via
where Y t is the GDP of the industrial sector and n 1 is the labour income share. The initial value of the log A is set equal to zero. T P = log A, smoothed by double exponential smoothing. Source: Y , CBB, NA, Table M3 ; n 1 , CPB, L ange Reeksen.
JJ:
job-to-job, rate, de® ned as the number of job-movers per 100 workers. This series is composed of the labour mobility measure, as collected by the CBS, Arbeidskrachtentelling , for 1975 , 1977 , 1979 , 1981 , 1983 and 1985 1972, 1973 and 1974 of JJ are based on a backward extrapolation of a regression of the yearly job-to-job mobility rate on lagged job-to-job mobility, the number of unemployed (U ) and vacancies (V ); V is the number of job vacancies in thousand units, and U is the seasonally adjusted unemployment in 1000 persons. Quarterly ® gures of JJ were obtained by interpolation, where account is being taken of the fact that the sum of these quarterly ® gures must equal the corresponding yearly quit rate. We do not approximate job-to-job movement by the vacancies-unemployment ratio (V -U) (cf. Burgess, 1988) because since the early 1980s the yearly ® gures of the job-tojob mobility rate and the corresponding V -U do no longer resemble; job-to-job movement rose much steeper than V -U. 
